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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Norway  has  achieved  an unprecedented  breakthrough  for battery  electric  vehicles.  The
market share  reached  17.1%  in  2015,  and  the total  ﬂeet  passed  2.7%,  some  70000  vehicles.
The  multilevel  perspective  framework  demonstrate  how  Norwegian  incentives  and  policies
gradually developed  over  a  25  year  period  through  interactions  between  the  international
landscape,  national  governance  networks,  regimes  and niches.  Actors  have  been  able  to
utilize windows  of  opportunities  leading  to the potential  establishment  of  a  BEV  regime
assimilated  into  the  ICE  regime  from  2016.  BEV  incentives,  some  of  which  have  been  in  place
since 1990,  did  not  yield  results  until  the traditional  vehicle  manufacturers  manufactured
BEVs  based  on Li-Ion  batteries  from  2010.  Norwegian  purchase  incentives  are  large  enough
to make  electric  vehicles  a  competitively  priced  alternative  for vehicle  buyers.  Increased
selection  of models,  improved  technology,  reduced  vehicle  prices,  and  extensive  marketing
have spurred  further  sales.
© 2016  The  Author.  Published  by Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
. Introduction
The introduction of environmental innovations in the fossil fuel-based transportation sector, such as alternative energy
arriers, will be required on a massive scale in order to be able to limit global warming from transportation activities.
he lock-in effects of existing technology, development and the introductory costs of new technologies and the existing
otoring practises are barriers limiting adoption. Understanding the processes involved in introducing such innovations
ill aid transportation policy makers in formulating more effective measures.
The combination of the electriﬁcation of transportation and decarbonisation of electricity will deliver deep cuts in CO2
missions (Williams et al., 2012). Battery Electric Vehicles (BEVs) reduce greenhouse gas emissions when the electricity
hey use is produced from renewables, as is the case for Norway, and to a lesser extent when the European electricity mix
s used (EU WTW,  2014). BEVs emit no local pollutants and are up to three times as energy efﬁcient as Internal Combustion
ngine Vehicles (ICEVs) (Figenbaum et al., 2015b). Hawkins et al. (2012) emphasize the need for an improved life cycle
nalysis of BEVs, but also ﬁnd that BEVs reduce greenhouse gases. The EU’s emission trading scheme (EU ETS, 2015) includes
lectricity production, and since there is a cap on total greenhouse gas emissions, a 100% reduction will in principle be thePlease cite this article in press as: Figenbaum, E., Perspectives on Norway’s supercharged electric vehicle policy. Environ.
Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.11.002
esult when BEVs replace ICEVs (OECD 2011; EU ETS, 2015; Figenbaum and Kolbenstvedt, 2015b). The effectiveness of EU
TS is a controversial issue. A comprehensive 2015 review found that EU ETS so far has functioned as intended (EC, 2015),
ut a stronger long-term price signal will be needed to provide incentives for investments in the sustainable transition to a
ow-carbon economy.
E-mail address: eﬁ@toi.no
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.11.002
210-4224/© 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
icenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Nomenclature
Acronyms
BEV Battery electric vehicle, only powered by electricity
ICE Internal combustion engine
ICEV Internal combustion engine vehicle
HEV Hybrid electric vehicle
PEV Plug-in electric vehicle, includes both BEVs and PHEVs
PHEV Plug-in hybrid electric vehicle, powered by electricity recharged from the grid and ICEs fuelled by diesel orgasoline, and alternatively, an ICE running as a generator producing electricity used in the motor
The market introduction of BEVs in Norway is an environmental transportation sector innovation that has diffused into a
national market at an unprecedented rate. In this article, the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) transition theory will be used to
investigate why and how BEVs have entered the Norwegian market, and how the political framework, stakeholder activities
and international developments interacted to create an environment in which BEVs could ﬂourish. Contributions to the
transitions theory literature come from the application of MLP  on a real world case that has evolved further than cases
previously studied in the transportation sector.
The article starts off with a presentation of the Norwegian context and status of BEVs. Section 3 presents the theoretical
framework, research method and material used. Section 4 presents the interactions between actors, consumers and events
at different levels, and how these have affected BEV diffusion. A conceptual MLP  framework for Norway is presented in
Section 5 followed by a discussion of results in Section 6. Implications for policy makers and transition theory development,
as well as overall conclusions, are presented in Section 7.
2. Norwegian context
Generous incentives have positioned Norway as the leading BEV market in the world. A market share of 18% of new
vehicle sales was attained in 2015 (OFVAS, 2016), whereas most other countries had shares below 1%. The share of the total
passenger vehicle ﬂeet reached 2.8% in 2015, increasing at a pace of 0.1% per month. Moreover, BEVs accounted for over 5.4%
of the trafﬁc ﬂowing through the toll road ring around the capital Oslo in 2015 (Fjellinjen, 2016).
Consumers have bought 80%, and own over 85%, of the BEVs sold and registered in Norway (OFVAS, 2016; NPRA, 2016). In
total, 140 000 passenger vehicles are sold in Norway every year. The total ﬂeet consists of 2.6 million passenger vehicles that
are driven an average of 13 000 km/year. Conditions for electric vehicle usage are favourable, as three-fourths of households
park their vehicles on their own land and can therefore install charging facilities, while another 12% park less than 100 m
away (Hjorthol et al., 2014). Most households also have a sufﬁcient power capacity installed to charge electric vehicles,
as electricity provides space heating for 74% of households (SSB, 2015b). The average household consumed 16 MWh  of
electricity in 2015 (SSB, 2016), while the energy consumption of a BEV would only add approximately 15%. The grid may
however need reinforcement, as some utilities already say no to home charging faster than 3.6 kW (DN, 2014).
Since 2012, BEV policies have been anchored in climate policy (CPS, 2012). However, the ﬁrst incentive became available
as early as 1990. Norway has no ICEV production. Fuel prices are also among the highest in Europe, whereas electricity is
cheap (Figenbaum et al., 2015a,b), with 96% produced in hydroelectric power plants (Figenbaum et al., 2015b). Powering all
passenger vehicles in Norway would only consume approximately 5% of the hydroelectric electricity produced in a “normal
year”.1
The Norwegian transportation sector is heavily taxed, which includes registration taxes on new vehicles, annual taxes,
taxes on fuels and numerous toll roads. This regime makes it possible to create incentives by selectively foregoing taxes
(Fearnley et al., 2015), thus inﬂuencing the types of vehicles sold. A range of BEV incentives have been introduced over the
years along these lines, also including incentives providing users with special privileges as seen in Table 1.
BEV buyers typically belong to multivehicle households that have many of the same characteristics of early adopters
as in Rogers’ (1962, 1995) theory on the diffusion of innovations, and on the buyers of new vehicles in general
(Figenbaum et al., 2015a, 2014; Hjorthol, 2013), such as high income and higher education. They also live in large households
in or around cities (Figenbaum and Kolbenstvedt, 2015a,b).
Fearnley et al. (2015) found that incentives reducing the purchase price have been the most effective in speeding up thePlease cite this article in press as: Figenbaum, E., Perspectives on Norway’s supercharged electric vehicle policy. Environ.
Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.11.002
diffusion of BEVs by evening out the sales prices of BEVs and ICEVs. Local incentives, such as bus lane access, exemption
from toll road charges, parking free of charge and reduced ferry rates, were valued in 2014 (avoided costs and value of time
savings) by BEV owners in Norway to be approximately 1 900 Euro/vehicle/year (Figenbaum et al., 2014), hence playing an
1 Estimate: BEVs consuming 0.2 kWh/km, average vehicle driven 13 000 km per year, 2.6 million passenger vehicles, 125 TWh  hydroelectric electricity
production; normal year = average weather.
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Table  1
Incentives, policies and initiatives in Norway; source: Figenbaum et al. (2015b).
Incentives Introduced Beneﬁts for users
Fiscal incentives – a reduction of purchase price/yearly cost gives competitive prices
Exemption from
registration tax
1990 The ICE vehicle tax is based on emissions, engine power and weight. Example taxes: VW Up  3000
D  . VW Golf: 6000–9000 D .
VAT exemption 2001 ICE vehicles are levied with a 25% VAT on the sales price minus the registration tax. The VAT on a
typical VW Golf ICEV could be as much as 5000 D .
Reduced annual vehicle
licence fee
1996/2004 Three rates apply for private cars. BEVs and hydrogen vehicles have the lowest rate of 50 D (2016);
conventional vehicle rates: 350–410 D .
Reduced company car tax 2000 The tax on using a company car is lower for BEVs, depending on income.
Direct subsidies to users – reducing usage costs and range challenges
Free toll roads 1997 In the Oslo area, the avoided costs are about 600–1000 D /year for commuters. Some places
avoided cost can exceed 2500 D /year.
Reduced rates on ferries 2009 Similar to toll roads. Drivers avoid cost of using car ferries.
Financial support for
charging stations
2009 Reduces the economic risk for investors in charging stations; reduces range anxiety and expands
the  BEV market, and gets more BEV miles out of every BEV.
Financial support for fast
charge stations
2011 More fast-charging stations become available, thereby increasing the BEV miles driven and the
total BEV market, including ﬂeets.
Reduction of time costs, which gives relative advantages
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lAccess to bus lanes 2003/2005 BEV users save time driving to work in the bus lanes during rush hours.
Free  parking 1999 The beneﬁt for users is to get a parking space where these are scarce or expensive, in addition to
the  time saved looking for a space.
mportant role in the rapid BEV diffusion. Moch and Yang (2014) and Fearnley et al. (2015), found that European markets
ith substantial incentives have larger market shares than those with less or no incentives.
. Theoretical framework, material and method
The BEV development in Norway should be reviewed within a socio-technical framework that conceptualizes transporta-
ion as a conﬁguration of elements (Rip and Kemp, 1998), including technology, policy, markets, consumer preferences and
ehaviour, infrastructure, cultural meanings and scientiﬁc knowledge (Geels, 2012). The system is maintained, reproduced
nd changed by actors, such as automakers, consumers, media, engineers, authorities and others. A major shift in these
ystems is termed a socio-technical transformation, which grows out of initial niches (Hoogma et al., 2002; Rip and Kemp,
998; Geels, 2002). Long development times and the life of vehicles, as well as the established practises of vehicle-based
obility must also be taken into account. A transformation may  therefore take decades to unfold as the new regime develops
arallel to the existing. On the other hand, Rogers (1995) states that when a critical mass of users have been reached, others
ill rapidly follow. Policies, including support for R&D (Rosenberg, 1982) and market incentives (Söderblom et al., 2015),
re needed to support the introduction of new technologies that are costly in the early stages of development. Some BEV
haracteristics, such as range and the time required to reﬁll energy, are inferior to ICEVs and constitute barriers to diffusion
Figenbaum et al., 2015a). The introduction of BEVs may  therefore require incentives and political commitment (Ramjerdi
nd Fearnley, 2014), a situation generally found for environmental technology (Jacobsen and Bergek, 2011; van den Bergh
t al., 2011), but may  also require information provisions (Faber and Frenken, 2009).
Among others, models or frameworks for the diffusion of technologies in a market have been developed by Rogers (1962,
995), Al-Alawi and Bradley (2013) and Dijk et al. (2012). Rip and Kemp (1998), Schot et al. (1996) and Hoogma et al.
2002) state that new technologies can grow through strategic niche management. Others attempt to present the complex
nteraction between different actors at different levels of society, and how that interaction affects the ability to make a
reakthrough, such as Geels (2005, 2012) introducing the multilevel perspective (MLP) framework to transportation. The
LP aims at explaining the diffusion of technologies as an interplay between actors and practises at three levels (Geels,
012):
. Niches, often demonstration programmes, involving users, buyers and niche producers
. Regimes with actors such as car producers, charging network providers, NGOs, consumer organizations, other industries
and established practises of vehicle-based mobility.
. The landscape with inﬂuential exogenous factors: oil price, international politics, peak oil, etc.
These “levels” refer to heterogeneous conﬁgurations of increasing stability, thus constituting a nested hierarchy in which
egimes are embedded within landscapes, while niches exist inside or outside regimes (Geels, 2012). The basic concept isPlease cite this article in press as: Figenbaum, E., Perspectives on Norway’s supercharged electric vehicle policy. Environ.
Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.11.002
llustrated in Fig. 1.
Although each transition is unique, the general dynamic according to the MLP  is that transitions come about through
nteractions between processes on these three levels: (a) niche-innovations build up internal momentum, (b) changes in
andscape level create pressure on the regime, and (c) destabilization of the regime creates windows of opportunity for
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niche innovations. Source: Geels (2012).
niche-innovation (Rip and Kemp, 1998; Geels, 2002; Geels and Schot, 2007). The MLP  helps understand why  there may
simultaneously be a ﬂurry of change activities (at the niche level), and relative stability of existing regimes, in uncertain and
messy transition processes (Geels, 2012)). The MLP  is a heuristic framework requiring substantive empirical knowledge,
which guides the analyst’s attention to interesting patterns and mechanisms (Geels, 2012, p. 474).
MLP  is commonly used at the global level. Nonetheless, Nykvist and Nilsson (2014) used MLP  in a local study on the
diffusion of BEVs in Stockholm to investigate three hypotheses for why the BEV market in Stockholm has not developed: (1)
a lack of niches or poorly functioning niches, (2) a strong ICE regime, and (3) the lack of economic incentives, policy direction
and visions (governance). In their analysis, the national governance “network” was  lifted out of the regime and placed in a
“national landscape”. They found support for the niche and regime hypotheses, but inconclusive evidence for the landscape
hypothesis. In climate policy, the national governance network will act on inﬂuences from the landscape, seeking to push
the regime and support niches. Consequently, there is an argument for lifting the national governance network out of the
regime level.
Norway is a highly successful BEV market and a neighbouring country to Sweden. The three opposite hypotheses will
therefore be tested in Norway, with the addition of a hypothesis that explores the importance of windows of opportunity.
1. The niche hypothesis:  The rapid development of BEVs in Norway is the result of well-functioning niches for BEVs to expand
in and from.
2. The regime hypothesis:  The rapid development of BEVs in Norway is the result of a weak ICE regime in Norway
3. The governance hypothesis:  The rapid development of BEVs in Norway is the result of economic incentives, policy directionPlease cite this article in press as: Figenbaum, E., Perspectives on Norway’s supercharged electric vehicle policy. Environ.
Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.11.002
and visions at different scales.
4. The opportunity hypothesis:  The development of BEVs in Norway is the result of “windows of opportunity” opening up
regimes, and niche actors taking advantage of these opportunities.
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A layer in-between regime and global landscape, termed “National governance”, is introduced to enable an analysis of how
ational policies have helped to contribute to making Norway’s BEV trajectory so different from that of other countries. This
ayer contains national transportation and climate policies, BEV incentives and initiatives to help support the Norwegian BEV
ndustry’s development in the early 2000s (Figenbaum et al., 2015a,b). External exogenous factors not controlled by actors
n Norway, such as the activities of the auto industry and the European Union, are placed in the international landscape. This
pproach allows for a structured and transparent analysis of the importance of national governance in explaining why the
orwegian BEV development deviates so much from that of other countries.
The x-axis for the MLP  framework is time and the y-axis shows the degree of societal structuration at different levels, as in
eels (2002). A third axis will be used in this article for a local, regional and national dimension for niches,  thus taking into
onsideration the importance of peer-to-peer communication in consumer technology diffusion processes (Rogers, 1995).
ogers’s theory of diffusion of innovations states that technology interested innovators are the ﬁrst adopters of innovations.
hey are inﬂuenced from outside information sources such as mass media, and can thus be geographically dispersed. The next
dopters, termed early adopters, take the innovation into use, inspired by these innovators and by seeing the technology
t work (Rogers, 1995). In turn, they are well connected with their peers, and respected for their judicious innovation
ecisions. Thus, they inﬂuence and inspire the early majority that live around them to also adopt the innovation (Seebauer,
015) through an experience transfer effect (Xiong et al., 2016) that make adoption much more likely (McMichael and
hipworth, 2013). Supported by this peer-to-peer communication, a critical mass will be reached and further adoption will
e self-sustaining (Rogers, 1995). Thus, adoption is expected to start in geographically dispersed niches that expand radially
nto regions eventually merging at a national scale, when the technology has evolved into a regime. The general concept is
llustrated in Fig. 2 as a basis for the analysis, with the ﬁnal result displayed in Fig. 11.Please cite this article in press as: Figenbaum, E., Perspectives on Norway’s supercharged electric vehicle policy. Environ.
Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.11.002
The following sources will be used in the analysis:
. Policy documents such as
• Government white papers, settlements and decisions in the parliament
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Table 2
Characteristics of the main periods in BEV development in Norway.
Period Characteristics
1989–1998
Experimental activities
Experiments, ﬁeld testing and attempts at creating niches and industrial development. Incentives justiﬁed
as  a means to allow experimentation to see whether BEVs could be viable. French Ni-Cd battery
industrialization enabled newcomers, such as the Norwegian BEV developer Think, to use this battery. The
period ended when Think went bankrupt.
1999–2002
Failure in attempt to expand niches
to a regime
The Ni-Cd battery industrialization led to the launch of BEVs from automakers such as Peugeot, Citroën
and  Renault. Needing BEVs to meet California regulations, the Ford Motor Company took over Think in
1999. New incentives were introduced to support Think.
2003 to the end of 2009
Successful niches keep the BEV
option alive
All major vehicle makers terminated BEV production in 2003, after changing regulations in California, a
slow  market uptake and Ni-Cd batteries no longer being an option with new European battery regulations.
Ford sold Think, and the political focus shifted to hydrogen and biofuels. Li-Ion batteries were not yet
available, and most countries abandoned BEVs. Second-hand BEVs became available for import to Norway
and  successful niches were established. Think was  restarted as a result of an increased policy focus on
climate, and a new model entered production in 2009. The period ended when the ﬁnancial crisis hit
Norway, and Think lost funding and was  incapable of producing.
2010–2013
Niches expanding regionally
Support for development of electriﬁed vehicles was introduced in the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis. The
Li-Ion battery was industrialized, the global climate focus was increased and new ZEV regulations were
introduced in California. Nissan, Mitsubishi and Renault successfully launched BEVs in 2010/11, but Think
went bankrupt again. BMW,  VW and others launched BEVs in 2013, and the Tesla Model S came about in
2012. Niches expanded around cities into regional markets, and a broad settlement on BEV policies was
decided in the Norwegian Parliament.
2014 to the start of 2016 Regional niches overlapped into a national market, and a new regime was on the horizon. Being the
A BEV regime on the horizon biggest importer of vehicles to Norway, VW launched the E-Golf. New customer groups were attracted,
reaching into the early majority segment. Some incentives had to be scaled back, and a new political
agreement was settled in the Parliament in June 2015.
• Municipal and provincial activities and policies
• White papers from consumer and trade organizations and NGOs
2. Historical material and literature
• Historical news articles (Retriever, 2015), reports, articles and papers
• Reports, articles on BEV market developments in Norway and internationally
3. Statistics
• Vehicle market and vehicle ﬂeet
• Energy and household statistics
4. Surveys of owners of BEVs, non-owners and interviews with stakeholders
• Survey of 1 722 BEV owners recruited nationally from the Norwegian Electric Vehicle Associations membership
register, and 2 241 ICEV owners recruited from the Norwegian Automobile Federation membership register in the
Oslo-Kongsberg region. The survey was conducted online in February 2014. The questionnaire was based on a review
of literature and older surveys. Further information on the design of these surveys is found in Figenbaum et al. (2014).
• Thirteen interviews (ﬁve with more than one interviewee) with transportation sector stakeholders in Norway between
April and October 2014. Further information is found in Assum et al., 2014.
These data sources are combined to analyse developments in the BEV market niches, the various actors’ involvement
in- changes to, regimes, national and international policies, and interactions between these levels creating windows of
opportunity, for ﬁve distinctive periods in the BEV development. The analysis will then be used to test the four hypotheses.
4. Niche, regime, governance and landscape developments
Since 1989, the Norwegian BEV market development has been divided into ﬁve periods based on signiﬁcant activities or
events arising in the niches, regime, governance network and international landscape, as seen in Table 2:
4.1. Experimental niche activities – 1989 to1998
In 1989, some pioneers started BEV niche activities in Norway. The ﬁrst BEV was imported by enthusiasts, who  were
inspired by the tour de sol races (BEV race) and the Solarmobil (lightweight BEV) exhibitions in Switzerland (Asphjell et al.,
2013). These pioneers applied for a registration tax exemption for that vehicle, leading to the ﬁrst BEV incentive, with the
exemption from the vehicle/registration tax being temporarily introduced from 1990. At ﬁrst, it was enforced as a letter
stating that an exemption was granted “to allow for the testing of BEVs”. The exemption became permanent in 1996. ThePlease cite this article in press as: Figenbaum, E., Perspectives on Norway’s supercharged electric vehicle policy. Environ.
Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.11.002
reasoning behind the exemption was, “to stimulate the usage and development of BEVs” (Ministry of Finance, 1989, 1995).
This incentive was crucial, as the progressive registration tax could amount to more than 100% of the sales value of the
vehicle. Because BEVs had a higher sales value due to low volumes and being a new technology, the tax would have been
prohibitive. This exemption laid the foundation for all subsequent BEV activities, as illustrated in Fig. 10.
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Upstarts, among them the Norwegian PIVCO2 and the Danish Kewet, attempted to develop small two-seater BEVs. Pro-
otypes of the PIVCO vehicle were ﬁeld tested in Norway and California (CALSTART, 1995), and a very limited number of
ewet’s were imported to- and sold in Norway. The municipality of Oslo and Oslo’s monopolist electric utility, Oslo Energi,
upported these activities. Deals between the Stavanger region’s electric utility company (owned by the municipality) and
eugeot in France, and between a Norwegian leasing company and the French utility EdF, resulted in the availability of
eugeot and Citroën BEVs in a few places (Figenbaum and Kolbenstvedt, 2015a). The ﬁrst market niches were municipal and
tility ﬂeets testing the technology (Figenbaum, 1994). These activities were separately established from the auto industry
egime, since importers and dealers showed no interest (Figenbaum and Kolbenstvedt, 2015a).
A small, BEV niche struggled to gain a foothold, through ongoing innovation processes, and gradually build political and
ndustrial support. The 1990 California ZEV mandate that included an obligation to sell 2% of BEVs from 1998, 5% in 2001
nd 10% in 2003 (CARB, 2015), was an important inspiration to Norwegian actors targeting the reduction of local pollutants
nd the introduction of clean electricity into the transportation sector. Actor networks, such as the EV association, were
nitiated by the municipality of Oslo and Oslo’s electric utility company with support from industrial actors (Asphjell et al.,
013) to help foster industrial and market development. It was founded in 1995 as a stakeholder organization, and inspired
y CALSTART, a California EV business incubator, took the name NORSTART.
The 1994 Winter Olympics in Norway saw the establishment of an industry and commerce network, “Birkebeinerlaugets
edriftsutvikling”, which worked for improved framework conditions for the Norwegian BEV industry. The Norwegian BEV
rototype from PIVCO (name changed in 1998 to THINK) was successfully demonstrated at the Olympics, operating down
o −20 ◦C, giving the company a boost in the search for investors that could support industrialization.
Free parking and free passing on toll roads were established as national BEV incentives from 1997 and 1999 by national
aws. These changes were induced by actors of the BEV niche, such as municipalities, electric utilities and ﬂeet users. Back
n 1993, an NGO started the process by seeking media attention, driving their BEV on the toll roads of Oslo and parking in
unicipal parking spaces without paying for either, thereby breaking toll road and parking legislation. The NGO’s goal was  to
ut pressure on the municipality of Oslo, and the Public Roads Administration, to allow BEVs to use toll roads and park for free.
he EV association and BEV actors pressured politicians from their side. Oslo’s politicians were receptive, as they targeted
ess local pollution and wanted to make Oslo an attractive place for Think to locate their BEV production, but nonetheless
ad to go to the government to obtain the required changes to the parking and toll road regulations. Municipalities now had
he tools to develop local BEV policies.
Advances in Ni-Cd batteries during the 1990s made it possible for French car manufacturers, to put BEVs on the market
n 1998 with government support (Arval, 2010). THINK used the same battery, piggybacking on the French development,
hereby reducing their industrialization costs.
As seen in Fig. 3, the price of a BEV was twice that of small gasoline vehicles in 1998, the quality was  not quite up to
utomotive standards and a proper dealer network was  not available, although a few ﬂeets and enthusiasts still bought
ehicles to simply experience the technology. The ICE regime did not ﬁght against BEV incentives, and there are no traces
f criticism in old newspapers (Retriever, 2015). However, hardly any BEVs were sold at the time (see Fig. 3), and Think and
ewet went bankrupt in the end of 1998, and BEV prospects thus seemed dim.
.2. Failing attempt to expand niches to a regime – 1999 to 2002
The Ford Motor Company bought Think in 1999. Ford’s main target was  to deliver low-cost BEVs to California to help meet
EV mandates (Ford, 2000) at a lower cost than their own internal BEV project (Figenbaum, 2015). Ford invested in product
evelopment and in setting up production, opening the Think factory in late 1999. Ford had expectations of deliveries to
eets owned by the Norwegian government to establish a viable home market for THINK (Asphjell et al., 2013; Figenbaum,
015). Nonetheless, the government did not instruct public ﬂeets to procure BEVs, stating that it was up to the market to
espond to the BEV incentives that had been introduced. Uptake in ﬂeets was  low, but a few municipalities and businesses
utilities, couriers), as well as technology- or environment-oriented consumers, tested BEVs. The summer/winter range of
pproximately 80 km/50 km,  high prices, reliability issues, battery service every 6000 km,  no EuroNcap safety rating, and
imited availability, were all barriers to adoption.
The Norwegian importer of the Danish Kewet bought the bankruptcy estate from Denmark in 2000, moved the equipment
o Oslo and initiated small-scale production.
With Ford on board in THINK, and a small BEV producer using the remains of Kewet, a BEV niche emerged. Speciﬁc BEV
umber plates (i.e. EL00001) were introduced from 1999 to make incentives easier to administer. Consequently, pressure
as on the government to introduce more incentives to support this cluster of BEV production, and reduced company carPlease cite this article in press as: Figenbaum, E., Perspectives on Norway’s supercharged electric vehicle policy. Environ.
Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.11.002
axation came in 2000. Municipalities such as Oslo and Stavanger, as well as utility ﬂeet owners, who  in the previous period
ad been eager to support the introduction of BEVs, were now not eager to buy BEVs themselves.
The vehicles proved too expensive for the market, hence resulting in slow sales, in part because the production cost of
he THINK vehicle rose 20% after Ford took over due to a need to improve quality and reliability (Figenbaum, 2015) and low
2 From 1998, the name was changed to Think, written as TH!NK.
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Fig. 3. Sales prices of BEVs in Norway compared with gasoline vehicles. BEV prices are without all taxes according to the incentives. ICE vehicle prices
include all registration taxes and VAT. Source: Tax Norway 2015, various webpages, news articles and historical sales material.Fig. 4. Passenger BEV ﬂeet in Norway, 2015 preliminary ±1%; source: Asphjell et al. (2013) and OFVAS (2016).
volumes. Exemption from VAT (then 24%) was therefore proposed to increase BEV competitiveness. It was  introduced in
2001 (Figenbaum and Kolbenstvedt, 2013; Innst. O. nr. 24 (2000–2001)) following a political agreement in the parliament on
a revision of the VAT law, with one sentence in the agreement stating that BEVs shall be exempted from VAT (Adresseavisen,
2000; Budsjettavtale, 2001). The municipality of Drammen (a small city 40 km south of Oslo) even introduced a 25 000 NOK
purchase support for its inhabitants (Aftenposten, 2001), resulting in an improvement for the competitive situation of BEVs.
The VAT exemption is seen as the reason for a price drop from 2000 to 2001 in Fig. 3.
Still, sales remained modest, partly due to limited vehicle supply. Ford was keeping production of the Think vehicle
limited, waiting for a new cheaper model better suited for the US market (Figenbaum, 2015). A slow increase of the BEV
ﬂeet followed, as seen in Fig. 4.
With government support, French car manufacturers put about 10 000 BEVs on the market in the period from 1998 to
2002 (Arval, 2010), including some that were sold in Norway.
At the end of 2002, Ford decided to sell Think after California amended the ZEV regulation in 2001, thereby allowing
PHEVs to fulﬁl most of the ZEV requirement. A lawsuit resulted in a further relaxation in 2003. Ford did not need to sell
Think vehicles in the US anymore, the Norwegian market was  still slow and the new model required further developmentPlease cite this article in press as: Figenbaum, E., Perspectives on Norway’s supercharged electric vehicle policy. Environ.
Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.11.002
(Figenbaum, 2015).
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Fig. 5. Tolling projects in Norway as of 26 Nov. 2015; source: NPRA (2015).
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From 2003, there were several BEV setbacks. French car manufacturers stopped producing BEVs. Poor sales, changing
riorities and a planned ban on Cadmium in batteries in the EU all contributed to that decision. By 2003, all automakers and
ost countries had abandoned electric vehicles. Ford sold Think in 2003 (Asphjell et al., 2013), but the new owner proved
ncapable of producing vehicles, leading to a new bankrupt within a couple years. Kewet lost the type approval, but by 2005
anaged to reclassify the vehicle as a 4-wheel “motorcycle” with less extensive technical requirements. The previous period
ad proven that there was a potential for use of BEVs in Norway, so politicians left the incentives in place in this turbulent
eriod.
In 2003, an administrative decision opened the bus lanes for BEV owners in Oslo and surrounding municipalities, after
ntense lobbying from BEV niche actors. An opportunity arose when the Public Roads Administration wanted to ban private
inibuses from bus lanes (Figenbaum and Kolbenstvedt, 2013). The access was expanded to all of Norway in 2005 after it
ad been demonstrated that busses were not delayed in the Oslo area. Moreover, private minibuses were thrown out of bus
anes in 2009, thus leading to a further boost in BEV demand.
A steady increase in toll roads around cities and main roads provided another geographically expanding BEV niche market,
ee Fig. 5, and by 2014 toll road revenues had reached 10.5 billion NOK, up from two billion in 2000 (Ministry of Transport
nd Communications, 2015).
The Norwegian BEV producers were not in a position to take advantage of these developments, as Think was  not producing
EVs anymore, and the Kewet production was only 100–200 hand built vehicles per year. These two  BEV niche markets were
herefore created and kept alive by importers of second-hand BEVs produced in France and by Think previously (Asphjell
t al., 2013), an opportunity created when other countries terminated their BEV activities.
By now, the EV association had evolved into a growing consumer organization actively promoting BEVs and ﬁghting to
eep incentives in place. It became even more difﬁcult for the government to touch BEV incentives, and they remained intact.
Think was re-established in 2006 by Norwegian investors, eyeing the political focus on climate policy as an opportunity.
 new model based on the vehicle Ford developed in 2002 was launched in 2009, but unfortunately the company ran out of
ash following the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008–2009. A Norwegian government investment fund provided support, but requiredPlease cite this article in press as: Figenbaum, E., Perspectives on Norway’s supercharged electric vehicle policy. Environ.
Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.11.002
hat an automotive actor should be involved in the project (Asphjell et al., 2013). Valmet in Finland bought into THINK,
lthough the production then had to be moved to Finland. The price of the Think vehicle, now with Li-Ion batteries, was
ARTICLE IN PRESSG ModelEIST-234; No. of Pages 21
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approximately three times that of small gasoline vehicles, c.f. Fig. 3. Some vehicles were nevertheless sold to bus lane and
toll road users, and Kewet3 introduced a new model in 2009.
Arguing that BEV should also be attractive in rural and coastal areas to help support climate policy targets, and as an aid
to THINK and Kewet, the government reduced rates for BEVs on national main road ferries from 2009 (Ministry of Transport
and Communications, 2008). Things started looking rosy for BEV niche actors, apart from the plans by major automakers to
introduce BEVs within a few years. The ICEV regime represented by the Vehicle Importer Association was  apparently seeing
a threat from BEVs, voicing concerns over the loss of tax income due to BEV incentives in the report from a Government-
appointed resource group tasked with looking at ways to improve the BEV market (Resource group, 2009). The politicians
ignored these concerns, and the incentives were kept in place. The political BEV targets had therefore moved from local
pollution and industrial development towards climate policy targets.
4.4. Niches expanding regionally – 2010 to 2013
After the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008/2009, the Norwegian government, inﬂuenced by NGOs, introduced an economic stim-
ulation package, including six million Euros for the establishment of charging stations for BEVs to keep up activity among
electricians (Innst. S. nr. 139, 2008–2009), while simultaneously improving BEV infrastructure. Nissan got UK support for
the Leaf BEV production facilities, (EIB, 2011; Nissan, 2010). At the same time, the EU had proposed the 95 g/km average CO2
emission target for new vehicles in 2020 (COM (2007) 856 ﬁnal), which indicated a need for a share of electriﬁed vehicles
in the sales mix  to reach the target and thus avoid ﬁnes.
The traditional vehicle industry re-entered the BEV scene in 2010, following advances in Li-Ion battery technology and
cost reductions as shown in Nykvist and Nilsson (2015), as well as a global focus on climates policies and measures. In
2010, Mitsubishi started sales of the I-Miev through all dealers in Norway. The ﬁrst vehicles were delivered in early 2011 to
desperate previous minibus drivers around Oslo who wanted to gain access to the bus lanes they had been accustomed to
using. Chaotic conditions occurred at the dealer in Asker, a municipality 20 km southwest of Oslo (Asphjell et al., 2013), and
over 1000 vehicles were sold in less than a year in Norway. Later the same year, Peugeot, Citroën and Nissan joined the BEV
market, and sales increased rapidly, as seen in Figs. 6 and 7. These producers proﬁted heavily on the opportunity created by
the incentives that were already in place, which was a result of the BEV niche actor’s struggle over two decades.
The Norwegian BEV producers Think and Buddy Electric (formerly Kewet) soon ran out of cash in the struggle to compete
with BEVs from these large multinational companies and importers with huge resources. For this reason, the Norwegian
BEV production ended (Figenbaum et al., 2015b).
A BEV-speciﬁc policy was proposed for the ﬁrst time in the white paper on Climate Policy in 2012 (Norwegian Climate
Policy, 2012), followed by a broad climate policy settlement in the Parliament the same year (CPS, 2012). A target for new
passenger vehicles to emit on the average 85 g CO2/km by 2020 is presented in the two documents. Figenbaum et al. (2013)
have shown that this target can be reached if BEVs and/PHEVs together will achieve 20–30% market shares. The settlement
further states that the tax system will be used in the greening of the vehicle ﬂeet, and Norway will continue to be at thePlease cite this article in press as: Figenbaum, E., Perspectives on Norway’s supercharged electric vehicle policy. Environ.
Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.11.002
forefront in the greening of the transport sector, while the government will contribute to the establishment of infrastructure
and allow BEVs to continue using the bus lane for as long as possible. No speciﬁc BEV volume target was stated other than
that incentives would remain in place until 2017 or 50 000 BEVs were on the road (CPS, 2012).
3 Kewet was  bought by the Norwegian importer Kollega Bil in 1999, changing its name to Pure Electric and later to Buddy Electric. In this article, the
name Kewet has been used to avoid confusion.
ARTICLE IN PRESSG ModelEIST-234; No. of Pages 21
E. Figenbaum / Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 11
F
p
s
r
ﬁ
B
p
g
4
p
T
a
i
2
s
s
o
b
s
big. 7. BEV, PHEV sales in the Private and Business sectors for the mini, compact and large-vehicle segments 2010–2016; source of data: OFVAS (2016).
By 2013, an increased selection of vehicles was  available (see Fig. 6), leading to a very competitive market with falling
rices. BEVs became a cheaper option than ICEVs in compact and larger vehicles, and on par with ICEVs in smaller vehicle
izes, as seen in Fig. 3. Sales therefore increased rapidly. The bus lane access and toll road user niches were effective in
ecruiting customers uncertain about the total economy of BEVs, as these incentives had an immediate and high value. The
nal breakthrough for BEVs came when the leading market actor, VW,  launched two models in 2013/14. Importers without
EVs lost market share, those with BEVs gained market shares and niches expanded across the country. The BEV association
ersuaded dealers to give away one-year membership for free to all buyers of BEVs, which rapidly gained importance with
rowth in membership.
.5. BEV regime on the horizon – 2014 to the start of 2016
The total BEV share of new passenger vehicles reached 18% in 2015. The main reason for the expansion over the previous
eriod was the increased selection of models from more suppliers and dealers, and that the VW E-Golf came on the market.
he share of sales of the electric version of the VW Golf, of the total sales of the Golf, was 48% in the ﬁrst months it became
vailable in 2014, and rose to 55% in 2015. If considered a separate model, the E-Golf would have been the bestselling vehicle
n 2015. Nissan Leaf was in third position in 2013 and 2014. Tesla Model S was the bestselling large vehicle in Norway in
014 and 2015 and number ﬁve of all vehicles sold in those years. The market shares of BEVs and PHEVs are shown per
egment in Fig. 7, illustrating that BEVs dominate the segments they are available in, with approximately 40% of private
ales in the compact and 50% in the large vehicle segments. In the small vehicle segment market shares are a bit lower.
More than 80% of BEVs are bought by consumers (Figenbaum and Kolbenstvedt, 2015b), whereas 74% of these werePlease cite this article in press as: Figenbaum, E., Perspectives on Norway’s supercharged electric vehicle policy. Environ.
Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.11.002
wned by multi-vehicle households according to a 2014 survey of BEV owners. Most users in the survey said they would
uy a BEV again, while less than 1% said they would not, indicating that the technology has been accepted in the market. The
urvey data also shows that BEVs are driven about as much per year as other newer vehicles, an indication that BEVs have
een easily assimilated into the transportation system. Owners are younger than traditional new vehicle owners. If they
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continue buying BEVs, then the market will expand over time through a cohort effect. On the other hand, municipalities and
businesses have been slow in including BEVs in their ﬂeets, thereby resulting in a weaker ﬂeet market (Assum et al., 2014).
Leasing, the preferred BEV ownership form, was  not exempted from VAT until the summer of 2015.
Fuel providers in the ICE regime, such as Statoil Fuel and Retail, joined the party in late 2015, and will install 40–50 fast
chargers at their petrol stations (Elbil, 2015) in 2016. New actors install home chargers that dealers sell as options with
vehicles (VW,  2015).
Since 2008, BEVs have spread out from the initial few cities, to their surrounding municipalities and other local niche mar-
kets, and these regions have ﬁnally expanded to the entire nation, as seen in Fig. 8. By the end of 2015, the ﬂeet had grown to
2.8% of the total vehicle passenger vehicle ﬂeet, some 70 000 BEVs, and 410 of Norway’s 428 municipalities had BEVs (NPRA,
2016). The diffusion has been supported by new geographically dispersed toll roads being established, by peer-to-peer com-
munication within geographical areas and to adjacent areas in larger and larger circles (Figenbaum and Kolbenstvedt, 2015a),
merging to a national market.
The BEV association had by 2015 grown into a large consumer organization with eight local organizations and 8–10
full-time employees, supporting 30 000 members (EV association, 2015).
The bus lane incentive was so successful that BEVs started congesting bus trafﬁc. From the summer of 2015, BEVs must
therefore have at least one passenger in addition to the driver in the most popular bus lane (along the main southwestern
road to Oslo) during rush hour. When the Tesla Model S appeared in the bus lanes, a debate heated up in the press and
among drivers in general about BEV privileges being for the rich (Retriever, 2015). The free ferry incentive was  downscaled
in some places after a national reform in road ownership in 2010 made provinces owners of what used to be government
ferry routes. The reduced rates on ferries apply to government-owned ferries, as provinces can decide on whether to keep
or remove the incentive. Toll road companies have not yet been threatened by increasing BEV share, as they are allowed
to increase rates 20% and prolong the tolling for up to ﬁve years. The BEV shares in Oslo’s toll ring reached 5.4% in 2015
(Fjellinjen, 2016) and 4% in Kristiansand (NRK, 2016). Moreover, a BEV share of 25% was reached in an underwater toll road
in October 2015 (Aftenbladet, 2016).
The government inked a new settlement in the parliament in June 2015 with the overarching principle that BEVs shall
continue to be an attractive option. As seen in Fig. 9, BEVs are now an essential component in meeting the climate policy
target of reducing the average Norwegian new vehicle emissions to 85 g/km as suggested by Figenbaum et al. (2013). The
vehicle taxation policy is gradually being adjusted to push emissions towards that target, while providing a predictable
economic framework for vehicle importers. A gradual phasing out of incentives as technology improves and costs go down
is planned (TTPS, 2015), and all vehicles shall eventually be taxed based on the external costs they impose on society. The
annual tax will increase to half the rate of ICEVs in 2018 and to the full rate in 2020. A low rate for BEVs on toll roads could be
introduced, and the reduced rate on ferries could be phased out. Exemption from VAT could be replaced by a subsidy scheme
that will gradually be downscaled. The fate of the bus lane and parking incentives will be decided locally in the future.Please cite this article in press as: Figenbaum, E., Perspectives on Norway’s supercharged electric vehicle policy. Environ.
Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.11.002
These developments indicate that at the start of 2016, BEVs have potentially become a regime in Norway, as one can
see changes in motoring practises, in expectations of what passenger vehicles need to be able to do, in ICEV regime actors’
pursuit of opportunities with BEVs and in the institutionalization of BEV activities. The emerging BEV regime consist of
two parts, one being part of the ICEV regime with Nissan, Volkswagen, BMW,  Kia, Renault and Mercedes/Smart as the main
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layers, and a separate Tesla “universe”. Tesla is a global niche producer, but grabbed the lead position in the large/luxury
ehicle segments in Norway from 2014. Tesla Model S is compatible with 98% of the average travel needs of Norwegians,
ven without using Tesla superchargers (Figenbaum and Kolbenstvedt, 2015b).
.6. Windows of opportunity and interactions between levels
Windows of opportunity have been explored many times during the BEV development, as seen in Fig. 10. After incentives
ntended to create opportunities were introduced, a ﬂurry of niche activities followed. Because these activities failed to
chieve sales volumes, new incentives were introduced, hence leading to further niche activities by new and existing actors.
lthough chaotic, the ﬁgure illustrates the most important interactions between landscape, governance, niches and markets,
hat over a period of 25 years culminated with the emergence of a BEV regime in 2016. It illustrates the very long timeline
nvolved in the BEV breakthrough, and how incentives introduced quite early were kept in place long enough for actors to
ake advantage of them. The development accelerated when ICE regime actors came on board.
The ﬁrst window of opportunity was opened when the very ﬁrst BEV was imported to Norway in 1990 without a registra-
ion tax being imposed. Twenty-six years later, the high tax on ICEVs and the exemption for BEVs, has become a prerequisite
or the BEV market expansion. Another prerequisite is the exemption from VAT, which was introduced 16 years ago to reduce
EV’s price disadvantage, but by 2013 this led to a price advantage. The bus lane access created a successful market niche
nd became a display window, with BEVs easily identiﬁable with their speciﬁc EL number plates. Awareness of BEVs has
hus spread to large vehicle using groups. Toll road users were another BEV niche which acted as a geographically expanding
isplay window, as more and more toll roads opened across the nation. These niches were initially built up through imports
f second-hand BEVs and sales of small “four wheel electric motorcycles”, such as Kewet’s, when no passenger vehicles were
vailable on the market. Bus lane users not only saved time, they also saved range in the winter by not being stuck in trafﬁc
ith the cabin heater draining the battery. Their experience with BEV’s was therefore more positive, in effect making them
EV ambassadors.
However, it was not until the technology had matured to a level where Li-Ion batteries could be taken into use after 2009,
nd the traditional automakers launched production of BEVs, that the window of opportunity created by all these previously
ntroduced incentives could be taken full advantage of. Incentives that had lured Norwegian’s into buying rather small basic
EVs proved much more potent when BEVs, with the size and quality that buyers were accustomed to from ICEVs, were
ffered for sale in an unlimited supply from trusted dealers. One could say that ICEV importers could skip the niche market
tage and go straight to the mass marketing they are experts at. BEV owners and potential BEV buyers saw the new BEVs thatPlease cite this article in press as: Figenbaum, E., Perspectives on Norway’s supercharged electric vehicle policy. Environ.
Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.11.002
ame on the market from 2010 as a step up from previous BEVs. The Mitsubishi I-Miev even came in second in the national
This Years Vehicle 2011” press award because the jury said it was a big step up for BEVs, offering comfort and safety details
n par with ICEVs (Dagbladet, 2010). In other countries, buyers likely saw BEVs as vehicles with limitations.
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Fig. 10. Exploitation of windows of opportunity for Electromobility in Norway, to be read from top to bottom as a chain of events. Arrows indicating oppor-
tunities  arising from previous events. Bold and thick arrows show essential Sequences of Events, green from national governance, blue from international
landscape, black from/within niches. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web  version of this
article.)
BEV niche actors, such as the EV association, embraced these new BEV actors. The EV association managed to persuade
BEV dealers to give a free year of membership in the association with each BEV sale. A positive feedback loop was  thus
created that enabled the EV association to work effectively to improve BEV policies to the advantage of dealers.
The Norwegian BEV owners and stakeholders evaluate the incentives that led to these windows of opportunity as pre-
requisites for the diffusion of BEVs in Norway (Figenbaum et al., 2014; Assum et al., 2014). In particular, the incentivesPlease cite this article in press as: Figenbaum, E., Perspectives on Norway’s supercharged electric vehicle policy. Environ.
Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.11.002
reducing the purchase price and access to bus lanes and free toll roads have been deemed vital (Ibid). In the book about the
BEV history in Norway, BEV incentives are even termed “EV victories” (Asphjell et al., 2013). Lobbying by non-government
organizations has therefore been important in the introduction of incentives. Accessible politicians in a small open country
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Fig. 11. Multi-level perspective framework for analysing Electromobility in Norway. Red arrows: International inﬂuence on Norway, Blue: Norwegian BEV
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olumes of BEVs: OFVAS (2015), SSB (2015a). (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version
f  this article.)
ike Norway may  have contributed to windows of opportunity opening up more often in Norway than in larger countries
ith more complicated governance structures.
. Resulting MLP  framework for Norway
Table 3 shows that the validity of the four hypothesis evolves over the four periods from 1989 to 1998, 1999–2002,
003–2009 and 2010 onwards. In total, these hypotheses seem to cover relevant aspects of the development of Electromo-
ility over 25 years in Norway. All hypotheses seem to be supported after 2014, paving the way for a BEV regime.
Fig. 11 sums up the relevant activities in the international landscape, in national governance, in the regimes and in the
iche markets discussed in earlier sections, all of which represent the proposed MLP  model for the BEV market in Norway.
The thick coloured arrows and events in bold in the ﬁgure show the main inﬂuencing factors and paths leading to the
arge Norwegian BEV market. National characteristics, such as governance traditions, clean electricity and low speed limits
n motorways, had an impact on this result. Other countries may  reach other results and need other policy mixes.Please cite this article in press as: Figenbaum, E., Perspectives on Norway’s supercharged electric vehicle policy. Environ.
Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.11.002
. Discussion
The niche hypothesis has found support. Combined with incentives providing owners with advantages not available to
thers, economic incentives that reduce user costs created effective niches. Users have experienced substantial economic
Please cite this article in press as: Figenbaum, E., Perspectives on Norway’s supercharged electric vehicle policy. Environ.
Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.11.002
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Table 3
Summary of test of different hypotheses on the factors behind the rapid development of BEVs in Norway by diffusion period; Red = not supported,
Yellow  = partially supported, Green = supported.
Period Niche hypothesis:
The rapid development
of  BEVs in Norway is
the result of
well-functioning
niches for BEVs to
expand in and from.
Regime hypothesis:
The rapid development of BEVs in Norway is
the  result of a weak Norwegian ICE regime
Governance
hypothesis:
The rapid development
of BEVs in Norway is
the result of economic
incentives, policy
direction and visions
on different scales.
Opportunity
hypothesis:
The rapid development
of BEVs in Norway is
the result of “windows
of opportunity”
opening up regimes,
and niche actors taking
advantage of those
opportunities.
1989–1998
Test of marketability
of BEVs, little
pressure from
governance network
and landscape
Tests of marketability.
Sales developed very
slowly. Customers
were mainly ﬂeets
testing BEVs. Vehicles
were unreliable and
had limited usability in
normal operation.
A period to ﬁnd out if
BEVs had a niche, what
it  was and if it worked
in cold climates.
No ICE regime protest against incentives. BEVs
were not considered a threat.
One importer took in a couple electric vans as
an experiment, testing the market.
No vision or policy
evident. Incentives
removing barriers were
introduced after
pressure from BEV
enthusiasts to allow
tests and experiments.
Example: Exemption
from registration tax.
Incentives were fought
for over a long period
before being
introduced.
Windows were forced
open rather than
opening up. However,
once open, they
remained so, resulting
in later opportunities
in the BEV diffusion
process.
1999–2002
Establishment of the
ﬁrst BEV niches
growing from initial
tests. Some ICE
regime support and
Norwegian BEV
production, and
some national
landscape pressure.
The main target niche
was ﬂeet vehicles, until
VAT exemption made
private consumers a
target group.
No successful niche
was established due to
lack of attractive and
competitively enough
priced vehicles.
Some ﬂeet users and a
few technology
enthusiasts bought
BEVs.
Most vehicle importers were indifferent to
BEVs, seeing no threat to sales, and did not
protest against BEV incentives.
2–3 importers got involuntarily involved in
servicing and selling BEVs around 2000, when
municipalities and utilities entered into
agreements directly with French automakers
and the French utility EdF about distribution of
BEVs in Norway.
Politicians reacted to
requests for improved
BEV policies, rather
than initiating them.
Policies were not
anchored to a
long-term national
policy.
The time horizon was
“until further notice”.
The motivation was to
support an emerging
Norwegian BEV
industry.
A window opened up
when the VAT law was
part of national budget
negotiations in 2001.
Clever lobbying
resulted in VAT
exemption for BEVs. In
retrospect, this was the
most important
incentive for BEV
diffusion in Norway,
reducing BEV prices by
20% from then on.
2003–2009
Niches  save BEVs
from extinction, as
political BEV support
vanished in other
countries and
Norwegian BEV
production
disappeared.
Incentives were,
however, left in
place.
A niche of importing
second-hand BEVs
appeared, leading to
successful market
niches: (1) Bus lane
users, (2) toll road
avoiders and (3) a few
environmentalists and
technologists.
Public ﬂeets were
mostly not buying, as
BEVs did not meet their
safety requirements.
The ICE regime started voicing concern over
BEV incentives in 2009, seeing signs that BEVs
were coming on a larger scale. They called for
technology-neutral incentives and more
incentives for hybrids, but policies were not
changed.
A more stable policy
framework emerged
when vehicle taxes
were tuned to support
vehicles with low CO2
emissions.
The reduced ferry rate
incentive was
introduced due to new
possibilities for
Norwegian BEV
production, and to
support climate policy
targets.
An opportunity came
when the Norwegian
Public Roads
Administration decided
to ban minibuses from
the bus lane and BEV
lobbyists managed to
secure access to the
bus lanes for BEVs. The
incentive have had a
profound impact on
sales of BEVs around
Oslo, generating a lot of
“buzz” around BEVs in
the media and among
people.
2010–2013
BEVs  are produced
by global actors.
Incentives in Norway
are becoming
effective and
inﬂuence actors.
Niches are expanded
regionally.
Existing niches grew,
gradually emerging
towards the
mainstream market
when more models at
lower prices became
available from several
vehicle manufacturers
having national dealer
networks. Niches
became regional. Fast
chargers were built to
help facilitate regional
driving.
Word-of-mouth from
owners to their friends
increased sales further.
The ICE regime was
further weakened
when some actors
assimilated BEVs into
their sales with success
(Nissan, BMW  and
VW), actively
supporting existing
and improved BEV
policies.
Those with no BEVs to
sell voiced concerns
over incentives
distorting competition,
but by now it was too
late. The policy was
ﬁnally working,
making it difﬁcult to
change.
The policy framework
became anchored in a
broad parliament
agreement with the
85 g CO2/km average
target for new vehicles
in 2020. This target is
only achievable with
BEVs being part of the
market. The BEV
incentives were to be
preserved until 2017 or
with 50 000 BEVs on
the road according to
the agreement.
The traditional car
manufacturers
launched BEVs into
what can be seen as a
giant window of
opportunity. Incentives
were in place and
Norwegians had over
two decades of
acquired knowledge of
BEVs and niche
markets were in place,
allowing them to move
directly to the mass
marketing of BEVs. A
rapid sales increase
followed.
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Table  3 (Continued)
Period Niche hypothesis:
The rapid development
of BEVs in Norway is
the result of
well-functioning
niches for BEVs to
expand in and from.
Regime hypothesis:
The rapid development of BEVs in Norway is
the  result of a weak Norwegian ICE regime
Governance
hypothesis:
The rapid development
of BEVs in Norway is
the result of economic
incentives, policy
direction and visions
on different scales.
Opportunity
hypothesis:
The rapid development
of BEVs in Norway is
the result of “windows
of opportunity”
opening up regimes,
and niche actors taking
advantage of those
opportunities.
2014–start of 2016
A BEV regime on the
horizon. Regional
niches growing to a
nationwide market.
The turning point is
from 2014 when sales
increased
tremendously paving
the way for an
emerging BEV regime.
Niches no longer have
a meaning. Fast
charging networks
expand along main
BEVs are assimilated into the ICE regime and
leading ICE regime actors also lead the
emerging BEV regime. BEVs are now an option
most buyers consider when buying new
vehicles, and dominate the consumer mini,
compact and large vehicle market segments.
The political will was
reiterated in 2015
when the conservative
government inked a
new broad agreement
on BEV policies in the
parliament.
Incentives were kept in
place and the market
could utilize the earlier
openings, with more
and more
manufacturers
launching BEVs.
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troads between regions.
avings or time savings. The bus lane incentive even had to be scaled back in the ﬁrst location in 2015 due to BEV congestion
elaying buses. BEVs also found many owners in locations with particularly expensive road tolls. Tax reductions have
radually evened out the price difference between BEVs and ICEVs, with a cost advantage available since 2013. The concept
f niches had no longer a meaning by 2015. BEVs have sold well everywhere, and are used as any other vehicle. In 2016, a
EV regime is under establishment, but without incentives no successful niche would likely have emerged initially.
The ICE regime hypothesis has been strengthened. Norway has no ICE vehicle production, which in itself is an indication of
 weak ICE regime. The government had no need to consider the impact of BEV incentives on the competitiveness of national
utomakers and more employment could be secured with national BEV production than with imports of ICEVs. BEV niche
ctors lobbying for incentives were therefore positively received by politicians. The ICE regime was rather indifferent to BEVs
p to 2010, and a BEV niche market was established without resistance. ICE regime auto importers who  could introduce
EVs into their portfolio did so when they became available, thus assimilating BEVs into their ICE regime. These ICE regime
ctors proﬁted on the BEV niche markets, which further weakened the ICE regime. As a result, ICE regime actors without
EVs lost market share, and protested against the BEV policy.
The governance hypothesis has been both strengthened and weakened. The policy goals were initially not clear, and
nthusiasts, municipalities, businesses and NGOs lobbied to receive incentives to help facilitate experimentation with BEVs.
ince sales were low, the government could offer incentives at barely any cost. Later, in 1998–2002, the political target was
o support industrial development, with more incentives introduced when sales did not grow. The period from 2003 to 2009
eft these incentives untouched, although sales remained low as only second-hand imported vehicles were available. BEVs
e-emerged on the political agenda as a climate policy tool leading to the ferry incentive being introduced in 2009 and an
fﬁcial BEV policy in 2012, and a rapid BEV deployment followed. The incentives addressed the various weaknesses of BEVs,
nd taxes on vehicles and fuels evened out the ownership cost. Incentives are national and regulated by laws without end
ates, thereby provided a long-term stable framework supporting niches.
Criticism of the BEV policies has mostly been absent or weak in Norway (Retriever, 2015). Incentives were introduced
hen sales were low, and the societal costs negligible (Figenbaum and Kolbenstvedt, 2015a,b). No apparent threat to the
ncumbent ICE regime was apparent for the ﬁrst two  decades, so automakers did not criticize the BEV incentives. Some
cademic criticism of BEV policies has appeared in Holtsmark and Skonhoft (2014) and in Aasness and Odeck (2014).
The window of opportunity hypothesis has been supported by the many events that seemed insigniﬁcant, but which later
ad a profound inﬂuence on BEV diffusion. The interaction between the layers, especially the governance network and the
iche actors, laid the foundation for the breakthrough. Niche actors cleverly interacted with the governance network and
egime actors to get incentives in place as opportunities arose. Each incentive had a modest effect on sales, but nonetheless
emained in place as new ones were introduced when new windows of opportunity appeared. Over time, a niche market
as built up, hence leading to a giant opportunity for the auto industry to launch BEVs directly into the mass market.
Norway’s BEV policy would not have worked without the long-term developments in the international landscape, such
s Li-Ion batteries, more stringent EU regulations on CO2, global climate policy negotiations, with the ZEV mandate in
alifornia leading to the development of BEVs by Nissan and other traditional automakers, as well as newcomers such as
esla. These developments made BEVs available in the market in large volume through efﬁcient distribution channels. InPlease cite this article in press as: Figenbaum, E., Perspectives on Norway’s supercharged electric vehicle policy. Environ.
Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.11.002
he eyes of Norwegian consumers, BEVs were transformed from small basic vehicles into normal sized vehicles having the
ame comfort, ﬁt and ﬁnish as ICEVs. Geels et al. (2012) state that while niche activities are important in the beginning, the
raditional regime actors will be crucial in a further transition to sustainable transport due to their complementary assets,
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such as specialized manufacturing capabilities, distribution channels and service networks, thus giving them a competitive
edge over niche actors. This point is illustrated in the Norwegian BEV market.
Norway and Sweden are neighbouring countries, yet the development of these countries’ BEV markets and policies are
very different. Nykvist and Nilsson (2014) found the lack of policies for BEVs in Stockholm, caused by market liberalism and
poor political experience of “picking winners”, such as the support for ethanol vehicles that backﬁred when biofuels became
more controversial (IBID), to be the primary reason for the slow BEV development in Stockholm. Climate policy was only
a weak driver. Norway has in its Parliament established a broad political agreement on the BEV policy framework as part
of the general climate policy, whereas Sweden is still in the process of elucidating potential policy options. Norway has not
had a poor political experience of “picking winners”. BEV incentives have been substantial for 25 years. The result has been a
ﬂurry of niche activities gradually growing into regional and national markets. BEVs have become a prerequisite for meeting
Norway’s climate policy targets. The international landscape factors have been the same in both countries, though the ICEV
regime is more entrenched in Sweden, with its vehicle-producing industry focusing on large vehicles. Policies have been
directed at supporting this industry. The high visibility of BEVs in Norway over a long time, and the presence of national BEV
producers, has given Norwegian consumers a more positive perception of BEV’s capabilities than what the Swedes seem to
have.
Electromobility has developed rather slowly globally in contrast to the rapid changes in Norway (Figenbaum and Kol-
benstvedt, 2015a,b). The risk of international setbacks in BEV development is therefore an uncertainty for the future of
Electromobility in Norway. Using the classiﬁcation of Geels and Schot (2007), the international BEV diffusion seems to be
on a transformation path. Moderate pressure on the ICEV regime is leading to the gradual establishment of a BEV regime
growing within the ICEV regime through a reorientation of the powering of automobiles, while keeping other basic vehicle
features unchanged. Because BEVs, PHEVs and FCEVs have now emerged as competing technologies designed to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, the global auto industry could be heading into a “de-alignment and re-alignment path” until a
“winner” has emerged. The pressure from the governance network has been large in Norway, leading towards a niche
actor-driven “technological substitution path” up to 2010, followed by a regime of an actor-driven “reconﬁguration path”.
As suggested by Geels et al. (2012), Norway may  push Electromobility even further by increasing the pressure on the
ICEV regime, now that alternatives to ICEVs exist and have expanded rapidly. Geels et al. (2012) also state that a transition
policy should be seen as a process lasting ﬁve, 10 or up to 20 years, which requires leadership, persistence and the ability
to deal with unexpected events. So far, there is evidence that Norwegian politicians have this ability, and the broad political
agreements in the parliament in 2012 and 2015 also point at strong leadership in the future.
The adjustments of incentives represent the other major uncertainty that can impact BEV sales. It will eventually not be
politically possible to recover the lost revenue resulting from increased BEV market share by taxing other vehicle owners and
buyers harder. According to the latest agreement in the parliament, BEV incentives will therefore gradually be downsized
from 2017, while simultaneously aiming at preserving the BEV market. A new generation and wider selection of BEVs with
double range (such as the Tesla Model 3 and Opel Ampera-E) will entice existing and new consumer groups, and the BEV
momentum could be maintained even if incentives are reduced. High fuel taxes (roughly 60% of the pump price) have a
stabilizing effect on consumer fuel costs, and BEV demand is less inﬂuenced by oil price ﬂuctuations than in countries with
low fuel taxes.
BEVs have mainly been taken into use by multi-vehicle households. Some may  therefore consider BEVs to be add-ons
leading to increased vehicle ownership. Figenbaum and Kolbenstvedt (2015b) estimated that some 60 million European
households own more than one vehicle, thereby providing a solid foundation to build a BEV market from. A longer range of
existing and future models, such as BMW’s  i3 and GM’s Bolt (GM,  2015), with an over 300 km range, which will be released
in the fall of 2016 and ﬁrst half of 2017, will increase marketability towards single-vehicle households, thus suggesting that
this issue might be temporal. The case of how Norwegians use the Tesla Model S points at a plausible future, in which BEVs
with a winter range of some 300 km,  mixed with shorter range BEVs, could take over most of the Norwegian automotive
market.
Within the MLP  framework, there is little guidance on when a new technology becomes a “regime”. The analysis in this
article points in that direction, but one cannot be certain that a “BEV regime” has been established in Norway by 2016, and
will likely not be the case for some time. BEVs do dominate segments they are sold in, users have few challenges using the
vehicles and they are being assimilated into the society at large. However, the share of the total ﬂeet is still modest because
of the slow ﬂeet turnover. The market is heavily incentivized, and the removal of incentives could lead to setbacks.
7. Conclusion
The MLP  framework of analysis has proven useful in explaining the dynamics of the policy framework for BEVs on a
national scale. Lifting out the governance network from the regime level, and positioning it between the international
landscape and the regime levels, made the policy dynamics of the case visible. The large taxes on vehicles and fuels have
given the governance network inﬂuence over the types of vehicles imported and sold. The BEV market in Norway was  createdPlease cite this article in press as: Figenbaum, E., Perspectives on Norway’s supercharged electric vehicle policy. Environ.
Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.11.002
when the governance network introduced incentives that enabled niche market actors to take advantage of landscape
developments, while simultaneously weakening the ICE regime. The ICE regime was further undermined by ICE regime
actors that took advantage of these incentives, thereby leading to a BEV regime under establishment within the ICE regime.
This dynamic is clearly discernible within the MLP  framework.
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The MLP  framework’s weakness is that it is not focusing on regional diffusion mechanisms or an individual’s adoption
ecision. The dynamics in Norway started in initial niche markets is scattered around the country in cities, and in areas
here users had large toll road cost savings. BEVs spread around these initial areas and to new places where local incentives
ecame effective, e.g. when new toll roads emerged. These niche markets eventually spread to the entire country as the
arket grew radially from the initial areas, then overlapped into larger regions, and ﬁnally the whole country. This ﬁnding
upports the notion that niche markets should have a geographical scale. Niches emerge locally, evolve regionally and grow
nto a national market before potentially ending up as a regime.
The system perspective, which is central to the MLP  theory, may  be lost when using a speciﬁc hypothesis for each level.
evertheless, the four hypothesis have structured the analysis. The fourth hypothesis, that windows of opportunity were
ssential in the introduction of efﬁcient policies, takes the system perspective into account, and system interactions have
een demonstrated between all levels.
The success of BEVs in Norway is the result of a long chain of events leading to opportunities that could be exploited more
fﬁciently over time. The pressure and opportunities arising in the global landscape, such as improved battery technology
nd an increased availability of BEVs, have been ampliﬁed by Norwegian policies and incentives. These incentives have
ecome more efﬁcient over time, and remained in place so long that users and enterprises could take advantage of them.
or instance, the VAT and registration tax incentive lowered the price disadvantage of BEVs up to 2013, but have since then
rovided BEVs with a price advantage.  The toll road exemption was in the beginning only effective in the Oslo area, but toll
oads have spread across the nation, leading to a much larger impact of the incentive over time. Norwegian actors were
ble to bridge the gap between the end of development of BEVs in 2003 and the global restart in 2009 by importing second-
and BEVs that became available when other countries abandoned their BEVs. The ability to offer tax exemptions has been
acilitated by the very high taxes on vehicles in Norway. Other countries without taxes on vehicles may  use bonus/malus
ystems to achieve similar effects or revert to support schemes.
A successful national BEV market, now an emerging BEV regime, is unlikely to have grown out of the niche markets by
016 without the large vehicle manufacturers launching BEVs. Proﬁting on the long BEV history in Norway and using their
ationwide dealer and service networks, they could go straight to mass marketing activities. Consumers in Norway have
roven to have the ability to utilize BEVs with a limited range in their daily transport, contrary to a belief in other countries
nd in the auto industry that range must improve before consumers will buy them.
Norway has proven that BEVs are marketable with sufﬁcient incentives in place. Other countries can be inspired by the
orwegian policies, but there is no guarantee that a transition will succeed. Niche markets may  fail to build up sufﬁcient
omentum or suffer setbacks, or tensions in existing regimes may  remain small so that ‘windows of opportunity’ for
iche-innovations do not materialize (Geels, 2012). Other countries may  need to follow other paths as different windows of
pportunities open up and the BEV technology develops further.
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